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A government employer, unlike its private-sector counterpart, 
must operate within the confines of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.1 While a private-sector employer can typically 
discipline or discharge an employee as determined by its business 
judgment,2 Title 42 § 1983 of the United States Code3 imposes liability 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A. cum laude, May 1999, Clark University. Tracy F. Mendonides 
dedicates this Comment to Fumi M. Farrell and Konstandina Mendonides. 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
2 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 442 (1958) (“Unless otherwise 
agreed, mutual promises by principal and agent to employ and serve create 
obligations to employ and serve which are terminable by either party”); see 
generally Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-at-Will: The Impending Death of a 
Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 653, 687 (2000). 
3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 
383-84 (1987) (internal citation omitted) (even if an government employee is 
“merely a probationary employee, and even if [the employee] could have been 
discharged for any reason, or for no reason at all, [the employee] may 
nonetheless be entitled to reinstatement if she was discharged for exercising 
her constitutional right to freedom of expression”).  
1
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on any government actor that disciplines or discharges a government 
employee in violation of the employee’s protected right to speech and 
association.4 This creates a unique tension in the government 
employment context between an employee’s right as a citizen to be 
free from governmental intrusion on personal liberties, and the 
government’s legitimate interest as an employer in limiting disruptive 
speech.5  
More than thirty-five years ago, the Supreme Court rejected the 
idea that citizens working for government agencies forfeit the ability 
to publicly criticize their employers.6 Therefore, if a public employee 
is speaking as a citizen and on a matter of public concern, a 
government employer may only restrict the speech as necessary to 
pursue its legitimate interest in operational efficiency.7 The Supreme 
                                                 
4 The essential elements of a § 1983 claim are: 1) deprivation of a right secured 
by the constitution or laws of the United States 2) caused by an action taken under 
color of state law. Hernandez v. City of Goshen, Indiana, 324 F.3d 535, 537 (7th Cir. 
2003) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979)).  
Government actors may be sued in their individual, as well as their official 
capacities under § 1983. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985).  
5 See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384 (noting the “dual role of the public employer as a 
provider of public services and as a government entity operating under the 
constraints of the First Amendment”); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 1966 
(2006) (Souter, J. dissenting) (noting “the tension between individual and public 
interests in the speech, on the one hand, and the government’s interest in operating 
efficiently without distraction or embarrassment by talkative or headline-grabbing 
employees”). 
6 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High School Dist. 205, Will County, Ill., 
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of State of N.Y., 385 
U.S. 589, 606 (1967)) (“’[T]he theory that public employment which may be denied 
altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has 
been uniformly rejected’”). 
7 Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1958 (“So long as employees are speaking as citizens 
about matters of public concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that 
are necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively”). Because 
these are post hoc employment decisions, and not content-based restrictions on a 
specific category of speech, they are not subject to strict scrutiny. See United States 
v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466-67 (1995). Rather, a court 
need only determine whether the employer had a legitimate reason to discipline or 
discharge the employee based on the speech. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1958. 
2
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Court recently refined this standard in Garcetti v. Ceballos,8 holding 
that a government employee speaking pursuant to an official duty is 
precluded from claiming First Amendment protection for speech “as a 
citizen.”9  
Although the Seventh Circuit was the first United States Court of 
Appeals to apply this distinction, Judge Easterbrook, joined by Judges 
Williams and Rovner seemingly ignored the analytical guidelines 
expressed in Garcetti,10 as well as decades of Supreme Court 
precedent,11 and applied a truncated analysis to determine whether an 
employee was speaking “pursuant to [her] official duties”12 in Mills v. 
City of Evansville.13 If Mills is interpreted broadly, its holding unduly 
limits the circumstances under which a government employee can 
claim protection for speech propounded at the workplace and creates a 
disincentive for employee’s to report internal wrongdoing through the 
chain of command. 
This Comment will contend that the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in 
Mills suggests an overly broad application of the standard announced 
in Garcetti v. Ceballos. Section I will recount Supreme Court 
precedent relating to the speech rights of government employees, 
including its recent decision in Garcetti. Section II will discuss the 
Seventh Circuit’s application of Garcetti in Mills. Section III will 
contrast the Seventh Circuit’s analysis with the application of Garcetti 
by other United States Courts of Appeals. Section IV will explore the 
repercussions of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Mills for 
government employers and employees in the Seventh Circuit. 
 
 
                                                 
8 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006). 
9 Id. at 1955. 
10 Id. at 1959-61. 
11 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High School Dist. 205, Will County, 
Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Rankin v. 
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
12 Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind. (“Mills II”), 452 F.3d 646, 647 (7th Cir. 
2006). 
13 Id. at 646-48. 
3
Mendonides: Speak No Evil? Government Employee Speech Rights in the Seventh C
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007




I. THE EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE SPEECH 
JURISPRUDENCE  
 
Prior to 1967, the “unchallenged dogma”14 was that a government 
employer could condition employment on whatever terms it saw fit, 
including those that limited an employee’s freedom of speech and 
association, without fear of being held to have violated the 
Constitution.15 Although this line of reasoning was eventually 
rejected,16 First Amendment protection for statements by government 
employees has emerged slowly, and protection for statements in the 
government employment context has been the exception, not the rule. 
 
A. Emergence from At-Will Employment Doctrine 
 
In the absence of an employment contract to the contrary, 
employment relationships in the United States are presumed to be at-
will.17 Under this doctrine, either the employer or employee may 
terminate the employment relationship at any time, for any reason, or 
                                                 
14 Connick, 461 U.S. at 143-44 (quoting Justice Holmes in McAuliffe v. Mayor 
of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892)) (“[A policeman] may have a 
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a 
policeman”). (internal citations omitted). 
15 See Adler v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), overruled by 
385 U.S. 589, 606 (1967); Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); United 
Pub. Works v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); U.S. v. Wurzbach 289 U.S. 396 (1930); 
Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882). 
16 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967). 
17 See generally James A. Sonne, Firing Thoreau: Conscience and At-will 
Employment, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. LAW 235, 235 n.2 (citing Peter O. 
Hughes, Employment at Will, 10-259 LAB. AND EMP. LAW (Matther Bender) § 
259.04 n.5 (2007), available at LEXIS 10-259 Lab. and Emp. Law § 259.04). 
(“[e]mployment is presumed to be at will in . . . every state” except Montana). 
4
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for no reason at all. 18 Although courts and legislatures have created 
exceptions to the at-will presumption,19 it nonetheless gives employers 
in the private-sector broad discretion to terminate their employees for 
any reason, including their speech,20 so long as the termination is not 
in violation of a contract or statute.21 While the at-will employment 
doctrine creates the illusion of equivalence, it has been criticized for 
creating a “vast disparity in power between employers and their 
                                                 
18 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 442 (1958); see generally Deborah 
A. Ballam, Employment-at-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 653, 687 (2000). 
19 Courts have applied implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, 
implied contracts of continued employment. In addition, public policy exceptions 
prevent an employer from terminating an employee for certain protected activities, 
which have included: whistleblowing, exercising a statutory or constitutional right, 
refusing to commit an illegal act, and performance of a statutory duty. See generally 
Amy M. Carlson, States Are Eroding the At-Will Employment Doctrines: Will 
Pennsylvania Join the Crowd?, 42 DUQ. L. REV., 511, 513 (Spring 2004); Deborah 
A. Ballam, Employment-at-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 653, 687 (Summer 2000); Stephen D. Lichtenstein and Jonathan J. Darrow, 
Employment Termination For Employee Blogging: Number One Tech Trend for 
2005 and Beyond, or A Recipe For Getting Dooced?, 2006 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 4, *7 
(Fall 2006).  
For statutory exceptions including state and federal whistleblower statutes see 
generally Peter O. Hughes, Employment at Will, 10-259 LAB. AND EMP. L. (Matthew 
Bender) § 259.04 n.5 (2007), available at LEXIS 10-259 Lab. and Emp. Law § 
259.04.  
For whistleblower statutes in states in the Seventh Circuit see 20 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 415/19 c.1 (West 2007); IND. CODE 36-1-8-8 (West 2007); WIS. STAT. § 
230.80 (West 2007).  
20 See Chris Oakes, 23 Fired for Email Violations, WIRED MAGAZINE, 
December 1, 1999, available at 
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/12/32820 (last visited May 2, 2007); 
Fired for Sending E-mail: More Employers are Reading E-mails, to Employees 
Surprise, CBS Early Show (2004) 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/08/17/earlyshow/living/caught/main636589.s
html (last visited May 2, 2007). 
21 See generally Peter O. Hughes, Employment at Will, 10-259 LAB. AND EMP. 
L. (Matthew Bender) § 259.04 (2007), available at LEXIS 10-259 Lab. and Emp. 
Law § 259.04. 
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employees”22 by giving employers the ability to leverage the 
employment relationship to pressure employees to act or refrain from 
acting in ways frowned upon by the employer.23 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents of the State of New York24 in 1967, courts justified a variety of 
restrictions on speech and association in the employment context by 
borrowing from the underlying theory of at-will employment 
doctrine—that an employee has no legally cognizable right to be 
employed.25 Accordingly, a public employer could terminate an 
employee for “the utterance of any treasonable or seditious word or 
words or the doing of any treasonable or seditious act,”26 for belonging 
to a group deemed “subversive,”27 or for simply “advocat[ing]” 
subversive ideas.28 Courts reasoned that such restrictions on 
government employment did not chill freedom of speech or 
association because employees maintained the option of “retain[ing] 
their beliefs and associations and go[ing] elsewhere.”29 Therefore, the 
personal liberties of an employee forced to choose between 
government employment and his personal beliefs were limited only “in 
the remote sense that limitation is inherent in every choice.”30 
                                                 
22 Amy M. Carlson, States Are Eroding the At-Will Employment Doctrines: 
Will Pennsylvania Join the Crowd?, 42 DUQ. L. REV., 511, 513 (Spring 2004). See 
also Stephen D. Lichtenstein and Jonathan J. Darrow, Employment Termination For 
Employee Blogging: Number One Tech Trend for 2005 and Beyond, or A Recipe For 
Getting Dooced?, 2006 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 4, *7 (Fall 2006).  
23 Amy M. Carlson, States Are Eroding the At-Will Employment Doctrines: 
Will Pennsylvania Join the Crowd?, 42 DUQ. L. REV., 511, 513 (2004). 
24 385 U.S. 589 (1967) 
25 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1983) (quoting Justice Holmes in 
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892)) (“[A policeman] may 
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a 
policeman”). (internal citations omitted). 
26 Adler, 342 U.S. at 489 n.5. 
27 Id. at 489 n.4. 
28 Id. at 489 nn.3, 4. 
29 Id. at 492. 
30 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967). 
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B. Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the State of New York:  
The Supreme Court Recognizes the Rights of Government Employees 
as Citizens 
 
By 1967, the courts of the nation had “uniformly rejected” the 
premise that personal liberties were not infringed by denying or 
placing conditions on government employment.31 Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court announced a new standard, holding that a government 
employer cannot “condition[ ] employment upon the surrender of 
constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct government 
action.”32  
In Keyishian, the Court invalidated as unconstitutional a New 
York statute that refused employment to applicants associated with 
organizations deemed “subversive.”33 And, although the facts of that 
case arose in the refusal-to-hire context, the Court strongly suggested 
that it would also recognize First Amendment violations for wrongful 
terminations.34 A year later, the Court confirmed that notion in 
Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205, 
Will County, Illinois.35  
 
C. Pickering and its Progeny:  
Balancing the Interests of Government Employer and Employee 
 
In a holding that changed the legal landscape for both government 
employers and employees, the Supreme Court recognized “it is 
essential that [public employees] be able to speak out freely on 
[matters of public concern] without fear of retaliatory dismissal.”36 
                                                 
31 Id.  
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 605-10.  
34 Id. at 607, n.11 (“there can be no doubt that the repressive impact of 
discharge will be no less direct or substantial”).  
35 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968). 
36 Id. 
7
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Keyishian held that a government employer cannot refuse employment 
on a basis that infringes a citizen’s freedom of speech or association.37 
The Pickering majority took that reasoning one step further by holding 
that a citizen who has entered into an employment relationship with 
the government does not relinquish his First Amendment rights as a 
condition of employment.38 Therefore, government employees cannot 
constitutionally be discharged for publicly criticizing their 
employers.39  
Pickering recognized a retaliatory discharge claim by a public 
high school teacher who alleged he was terminated for writing a letter 
to the local newspaper that criticized a tax-increase proposal supported 
by the Board and the Superintendent of Schools.40 In his letter, Marvin 
L. Pickering accused the Board of channeling taxpayer funds towards 
athletics rather than to the programs and improvements that the Board 
had previously promised41 and accused the Superintendent of 
attempting to curb employee speech on the issue by threatening to 
impose discipline on teachers that openly opposed the new proposal.42  
 The reasoning in Pickering was twofold. In addition to vindicating 
the First Amendment rights of public employees as citizens, the 
Pickering majority also recognized the value of employee speech to 
the “free marketplace of ideas”43 protected by First Amendment 
jurisprudence, noting that government employees are often in a unique 
position to comment upon the efficient operation of their employers, 
and therefore, have valuable insight that should be made available to 
the community.44 As a result, allowing government employers to 
                                                 
37 Id. at 568. 
38 Id. 
39 See id. at 574 (“a[n] [employee’s] exercise of his right to speak on issues of 
public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from pubic 
employment”). 
40 Id. at 565-66. 
41 Id. at 575-78 app. A. 
42 Id. at 576 app. A. 
43 See generally Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 321 (1977); Keyishian v. 
Bd. of Regents of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
44 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72.  
8
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punish any employee speech that is critical or deemed “detrimental to 
the best interests” of the employer could have the effect of depriving 
the public of information needed to make well-informed decisions.45  
At the same time, however, the Court acknowledged the 
competing interest of “the State . . . as an employer in regulating [the] 
speech [of its employees].”46 Therefore, Pickering holds that courts are 
charged with the responsibility of determining “a balance between the 
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters 
of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.”47  
Under Pickering, the initial stage of analysis requires a court to 
determine whether the employee’s statements were made “as a citizen . 
. . upon matters of public concern.”48 If they were, then the statements 
are protected.49 Nonetheless a government employer may 
constitutionally discipline or discharge an employee even for protected 
statements if it can show its interests as an employer “in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs” outweigh “the interests of 
the [employee], as a citizen, in [making the statements]” under the 
second, balancing stage of Pickering analysis.50 
While the Supreme Court recognized the “enormous variety of 
fact situations” that may lead to First Amendment claims under 
Pickering and declined to lay down a bright-line rule for determining 
legitimate government interests in regulating employee speech,51 it 
suggested that relevant considerations under the second-stage of 
analysis include: whether the statement interferes with the employer’s 
ability to maintain discipline or harmony among its workers, whether 
it has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which 
                                                 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 568. 
48 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006).  
49 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 569  
9
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“personal loyalty and confidence” are reasonably required, or whether 
the statement impedes the performance of the employee’s daily duties 
or interferes with the regular operation of the employer.52 The Court 
further suggested that the government may have greater, even 
absolute, ability to control the speech of high-level employees, 
depending on the nature of their position.53 
Pickering was a victory for government employees wishing to 
engage in civic discussion publicly. Yet even though the holding 
clearly protected speech propounded to the public, the opinion left 
open the issue of what types of statements could form the basis for 
viable First Amendment retaliation claims beyond those made in a 
public forum.  
Ten years later, the Supreme Court resolved any doubts regarding 
whether First Amendment protection for government employees 
extended only to statements made to the public.54 In Givhan v. Western 
Line Consolidated School District, the Court held that First 
Amendment protection extends both to statements made to the public 
as well as to statements at the workplace.55 As such, a school teacher’s 
private complaints to the school principal about what she perceived to 




                                                 
52 Id. at 570-73 (1968); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151-52 
(1983); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987).  
53 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570 n.3; see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52 (1983) 
(again noting, “when close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public 
responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s judgment is 
appropriate”). 
54 Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 (1979). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 414; see also Rankin, 483 U.S. at 386-88 (holding First Amendment 
protection extended to private statements made by an employee to a co-worker 
regarding the attempted assassination of then President, Ronald Reagan. Therefore, 
the plaintiff-employee’s statement could not form the basis for discharge absent a 
showing that the statement interfered with the “efficient functioning of the office”). 
10
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D. The Modern Standard:  
Striking the Balance in Favor of the Employer 
 
Despite the protection offered to public employees by Pickering 
and Givhan, the Supreme Court has recognized that not all employee 
speech relating to the internal operations of a government employer is 
protected by the First Amendment as a “matter of public concern.”57 
Although “speech on public issues occupies the ‘highest rung of the 
hierarchy of First Amendment values,’ and is entitled to special 
protection,”58 Supreme Court precedent makes clear that a government 
employer is, nonetheless, an employer, and as such retains broad 
discretion to discipline an employee where the employee is not 
speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern.59  
 
1. Connick v. Myers 
 
By 1983, it was well-established that the rights of government 
employees could not be abridged as a condition of employment.60 But, 
the Supreme Court also recognized that “government offices could not 
function if every employment decision became a constitutional 
matter.”61 Therefore, the Supreme Court in Connick held: 
 
                                                 
57 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148-49 (1983). 
58 Id. at 145 (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 
913 (1982)). 
59 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (when employee expression “cannot be fairly 
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the 
community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their 
offices”); Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384 (“public employers are employers, concerned with 
the efficient function of their operations; review of every personnel decision made by 
a public employer could, in the long run, hamper the performance of public 
functions”).  
60 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Twp. High School Dist. 205, Will County, Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Keyishian 
v. Bd. of Regents of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967). 
61 Connick, 461 U.S. at 143. 
11
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[W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon 
matters of public concern, but instead as an employee 
upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most 
unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the 
appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a 
personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly 
in reaction to the employee’s behavior.62 
  
Connick excludes statements that are essentially an employee’s 
personal grievances from protection as “matters of public concern.”63 
By doing so, the Court maintained protection of employee speech on 
matters of value to the public while at the same time protecting the 
government from employees seeking to “constitutionalize the 
employee grievance” by turning any adverse employment decision 
into a constitutional claim by asserting that their grievances address 
matters of public concern.64  
Sheila Myers, the plaintiff in Connick, was an Assistant District 
Attorney who vocally opposed her proposed transfer to another 
department.65 She was discharged after distributing a questionnaire to 
her co-workers that created what was described by Myers’ supervisor 
as, a “mini-insurrection” within the office.66 Among other things, the 
questionnaire asked co-workers whether they believed the office 
procedure regarding transfers was fair, whether they thought there was 
an active “rumor mill” in the office, and whether they had confidence 
in and would rely on the work of five individually named 
supervisors.67  
Myers argued that the questionnaire was protected under the First 
Amendment because it addressed matters of public concern.68 
                                                 
62 Id. at 147 (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1976)). 
63 Connick, 461 U.S. at 141. 
64 Id. at 154. 
65 Id. at 140-41. 
66 Id. at 140. 
67 Id. at 257 app. A.  
68 Id. at 141. 
12
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However, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that any matter relating 
the internal operations of a government employer—down to office 
procedure regarding transfers, and whether individual employees have 
confidence in their supervisors—is a matter of public concern simply 
because it may tangentially relate to governmental efficiency.69  
The Court held whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter 
of public concern is a fact-intensive inquiry to be determined by the 
“content, form and context” of the statement “as revealed by the whole 
record.”70 And, an issue such as employee confidence in supervisors, 
that is “not otherwise of public concern” does not rise to that level 
simply because “its subject matter . . . might be of general interest” if 
communicated to the public.71  
In addition to limiting what constitutes a matter of public concern 
Connick gave further judicial deference to the business judgment of 
government employers by suggesting that the government has broad 
discretion to discipline its employees contemporaneously based on the 
predicted results of the speech.72 Moreover, the Court rejected Myers’ 
assertion that the government was required to justify her termination 
by showing that the questionnaire “substantially interfered” with the 
operations of the office.73 Rather, the state’s burden in justifying a 
                                                 
69 Id. at 149 (“To presume that all matters which transpire within a government 
office are of public concern would mean that virtually every remark—and certainly 
every criticism directed at a public official—would plant the seed of a constitutional 
case”). 
70 Id. at 147-48. 
71 Id. at 148 n.8. However, the Court ultimately held that Myers’ question 
regarding whether employees felt pressured to work on political campaigns was a 
matter of public concern; therefore, Pickering balancing was required. Id. at 149. 
72 Id. (a government employer is not required to “allow events to unfold to the 
extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is 
manifest before taking action”). But, importantly, the Court cautioned that a 
“stronger showing” of disruption or potential disruption may be required where the 
employee’s speech “more substantially involved matters of public concern [than 
Myers’ questionnaire].” Id.  
73 Id. at 149. 
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particular discharge will vary depending on the nature of the 
employee’s expression.74 
 
2. Post-Connick decisions 
 
 After Connick, the United States Courts of Appeals applied 
various methods of analysis to determine whether a government 
employee was speaking “as a citizen upon matters of public concern 
[or] instead as an employee upon matters of personal interest.”75 Many 
circuits held that whether an employee was speaking as a citizen on a 
matter of public concern was intent-based.76 In those circuits, the 
question was: Was the employee speaking primarily as a concerned 
citizen, or as an employee merely interested in internal procedure?77 
Under this method of analysis, if an employee was motivated by a 
personal grievance, the speech was precluded from protection as a 
matter of public concern.78  
The Seventh Circuit held that intent was a factor, but not the most 
important factor.79 In the Seventh Circuit, whether the speech 
constituted a matter of public concern was determined by the “content, 
form, and context” of the given statement, with content being the most 
important factor.80 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit rejected the idea that 
speech on a matter of public concern lost its protected status if it was 
expounded only for personal reasons, rather than a desire to “air the 
                                                 
74 Id. at 150. 
75 Id. at 147. 
76 See Saulpaugh v. Monroe Cmty. Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 1993); 
David v. City of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1356 (10th Cir. 1996); Morgan v. Ford, 6 
F.3d 750, 755 (11th Cir. 1993). 
77 See Morgan, 6 F.3d at 754. 
78 See Saulpaugh, 4 F.3d 134 at 143; David, 101 F.3d at 1356; Morgan, 6 F.3d 
at 755. 
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merits of the issue.”81 Accordingly, if the content of the speech 
addressed a matter of public concern, the speech was protected, 
irrespective of the employee’s motive for engaging in the speech.82 
 
3. Garcetti v. Ceballos 
 
In 2006, the Supreme Court clarified the Pickering/Connick test 
but imposed an additional hurdle upon government employees by 
bifurcating the initial stage of analysis.83 Under Garcetti, an employee 
must be speaking both as a citizen and on a matter of public concern 
before reaching the balancing stage of Pickering.84 Therefore, if a 
public employee cannot establish that he was speaking as a citizen, 
and not as an employee “pursuant to . . . official duties”85 the 
government is free to punish the speech at its discretion, and courts 
will not examine the government interest in regulating the speech, 
even if the speech addresses a matter of public concern.86  
Richard Ceballos, the plaintiff in Garcetti, was an Assistant 
District Attorney who claimed his First Amendment rights were 
violated when he suffered a series of allegedly adverse employment 
actions stemming from a disposition memorandum he wrote to his 
supervisor detailing what he believed were serious misrepresentations 
                                                 
81 Wainscott v. Henry, 315 F.3d 844, 850 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Animosity in a 
supervisor-subordinate relationship cannot be the sole basis for characterizing an 
unflattering statement as a personal grievance” and thereby excluding the statement 
from protection); Smith v. Fruin, 28 F.3d 646, 652 (7th Cir. 1994) (“the content of 
some remarks may life the speech to the level of public concern even if the 
employee’s reasons for speaking out are entirely self-interested”). 
82 Wainscott, 315 F.3d at 850; Smith, 28 F.3d at 652. 
83 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006). 
84 Id. at 1961 (“When an employee speaks as a citizen addressing a matter of 
public concern, they First Amendment requires a delicate balancing of the competing 
interests surrounding the speech and its consequences. When, however, the 
employee is simply performing his or her job duties, there is no warrant for a similar 
degree of scrutiny”). 
85 Id. at 1960. 
86 Id. at 1961. 
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in an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant in a pending case.87 
Ceballos was alerted to the potential inaccuracies in early 2000 by a 
defense lawyer.88 Based on a personal investigation, Ceballos believed 
that the warrant affiant, a deputy sheriff, “at least grossly 
misrepresented the facts.”89  
Following a meeting with his immediate supervisor and the Head 
Deputy District Attorney regarding the inaccuracies, Ceballos 
completed a disposition memo in which he detailed the inconsistencies 
and recommended that the pending case be dismissed.90 Ceballos’ 
supervisor directed him to revise the memo to make it “less 
accusatory” of the warrant affiant.91 After Ceballos wrote a second 
disposition memo again recommending that the case be dismissed, he 
was “sharply criticiz[ed]” for his handling of the case during a meeting 
with his superiors.92 Following his supervisor’s decision to proceed 
with the case, Ceballos alleged that he was subject to a series of 
retaliatory employment actions including reassignment from his 
calendar deputy position to a trial deputy position, transfer to another 
courthouse, and denial of a promotion.93 The Supreme Court held that 
the First Amendment did not protect Ceballos from discipline for his 
statements in the disposition because those statements were made 
“pursuant to [his] official duties” and, therefore, could be controlled at 
his employer’s discretion.  
Garcetti holds that speech espoused by a public employee 
pursuant to an employment duty is precluded from protection as 
speech “as a citizen,” even if the employee was motivated by his 
                                                 
87 Id. at 1955-56. 
88 Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled by 126 
S. Ct. at 1960.  
89 Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1956. 
93 Id. 
16
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 9
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss2/9
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 2                       Spring 2007 
683 
concerns as a citizen.94 Where an employee is speaking pursuant to his 
official duties, he is not speaking as a citizen, and his speech does not 
rise to that level by virtue of its subject matter, or his intent in 
forwarding the statement.95  
In justifying this limit, the Court reasoned that “[r]estricting 
speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional 
responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might 
have enjoyed as a private citizen. Rather, it simply reflects the exercise 
of employer control over what the employer has itself commissioned 
or created.”96  
Garcetti made clear that statements by government employees are 
not automatically precluded from First Amendment protection simply 
because they are made at the workplace, or because they concern the 
subject-matter of employment.97 The Supreme Court also rejected the 
idea “that employers can restrict employees’ rights by creating 
excessively broad job descriptions.”98 But outside of these very 
general guidelines, the Supreme Court did not specify a method of 
analysis for determining when statements are made “pursuant to [an 
employee’s] official duties” other than holding that the “proper inquiry 
is a practical one” into the “scope of the employee’s professional 
duties.”99 Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit seems to have ignored even 
these limited guidelines in Mills v. City of Evansville.100 
                                                 
94 See id. at 126 S.Ct. at 1960 (“Ceballos wrote his disposition memo because 
that is part of what he, as a calendar deputy, was employed to do. It is immaterial 
whether he experienced some personal gratification from writing the memo; his First 
Amendment rights do not depend on his job satisfaction”). 
95 See id. at 126 S.Ct. at 1956-57 (In holding that an employee must be 
speaking both as a citizen, and on a matter of public concern, the Supreme Court 
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that because the content of the disposition 
memo, was “inherently . . . of public concern” and not of personal interest, Ceballos’ 
memo was protectable as speech “as a citizen”). 
96 Id. at 1960. 
97 Id. at 1959. 
98 Id. at 1961. 
99 Id. at 1962. 
100 (“Mills II”), 452 F.3d 646, 646-48 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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II. MILLS V. CITY OF EVANSVILLE 
 
Mills was decided approximately three weeks after Garcetti 
issued,101 making the Seventh Circuit the first United States Court of 
Appeals to apply the Supreme Court decision to determine when an 
employee’s statements are made “pursuant to [an] official duty.” But 
rather than defining a method of analysis, Judges Easterbrook, 
Williams, and Rovner ignored Garcetti’s guidelines by failing to 
address the scope of Mills’ job responsibilities and instead summarily 
held that the Brenda Mills’ statements were precluded from First 
Amendment protection without articulating a reasoned basis for their 
decision.102 
The Seventh Circuit’s truncated analysis is flawed for three 
reasons. First, the Seventh Circuit unnecessarily extended Garcetti 
beyond the internal document scenario addressed in that case. Second, 
even assuming the Seventh Circuit was justified in extending Garcetti, 
the Court ignored the analytical guidelines articulated by the Supreme 
Court and failed to provide a reasoned basis for that extension. Third, 
by extending Garcetti without identifying the facts on which it based 
its decision, the Seventh Circuit suggested a confusingly broad rule 
that is unduly restrictive and benefits neither government employees 
nor their employers. 
 
A. Facts of the Case 
 
Brenda Mills worked as a police officer for the City of Evansville, 
Indiana for twenty-seven years.103 For the last six years of her 
employment, her duties included supervising the “Crime Prevention 
                                                 
101 Id. at 646. 
102 See id. at 648 (Judge Easterbrook dedicates only one paragraph of a one and 
a half page opinion to the issue of whether Brenda Mills was speaking pursuant to 
her official duties). 
103 Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind. (“Mills I”), No. 3:03CV00183-JDT-WGH, 
2005 WL 1939917, at *1 (S.D. Ind. June 28,2005), overruled by 452 F.3d 646, 646-
48 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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Officers” assigned throughout the City’s West Sector. 104 In Mills’ 
words, these officers were: “part of the patrol division . . . assigned 
throughout the city to, in part, interact with neighborhood associations 
in an effort to reduce the incidence of crime, foster good community 
relationships and deal with quality of life issues.”105  
Sometime prior to January 2002, the Evansville Chief of Police 
proposed a re-structuring plan aimed at dealing with a manpower 
shortage within the city’s Police Department that would reduce the 
number of Crime Prevention Officers on Mills’ shift by one.106 The 
Chief formally announced his plan at a meeting of upper level staff 
members on January 18, 2002, which Mills attended in lieu of her 
supervisor.107 The meeting was on departmental premises, and Mills 
was on-duty and in uniform both during and after the meeting.108  
After the meeting ended, the Chief approached Mills and initiated 
a conversation in the public lobby of the Police Station.109 The Chief 
informed Mills that he was concerned because he had heard that some 
of the Crime Prevention Officers had attended a neighborhood meeting 
where they informed neighborhood association members that they 
could contact the Mayor in order to prevent the removal of the Crime 
Prevention Officer on Mills’ shift.110 Other of Mills’ superiors were 
present during the conversation, although whether the conversation 
could be overheard by others passing through the lobby area was 
disputed.111 During the conversation, Mills expressed her opinion to 
                                                 
104 Mills I, 2005 WL 1939917, at *1. 
105 Id.; Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind. (“Mills II”), 452 F.3d 646, 647 (7th Cir. 
2006). 
106 Mills II, 452 F.3d at 647. 
107 Mills I, 2005 WL 1939917, at *1. 
108 Mills II, 452 F.3d at 647. 
109 Mills I, 2005 WL 1939917, at *1. According to Mills, the Chief approached 
her and said, “If the [Crime Prevention Officers] want a problem, they can have it.” 
Br. of Pl.-Appellant at *5, Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind., No. 05-3207 (7th Cir. 
Oct. 31, 2005).  
110 Mills II at *1. 
111 Br. of Pl.-Appellant at *7, Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind., No. 05-3207 
(7th Cir. Oct. 31, 2005). 
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the Chief and the other superior officers present “that the plan would 
not work, that community organizations would not let the change 
happen, and that sooner or later [the Chief] would have to restore the 
old personnel assignment policies.”112  
Twelve days after Mills made the statements in the lobby, Captain 
Brad Hill, who had joined the January 18th conversation between 
Mills and her superiors at some point in the middle, put a “Summary 
of Counseling” in Mills’ file that “disapproved [of] her attitude at the 
meeting, her choice of time and place for presenting her views, and her 
failure to work through the chain of command.” 113 Mills agreed in her 
response to the Summary that the time and place were inappropriate, 
but indicated she felt she was left “with no recourse except to respond” 
because the Chief continued to press her to state her opinion.114 
Shortly over a month after the “Summary of Counseling” was put 
in Mills’ file, Mills was removed from her supervisory position on the 
first shift and transferred to patrol duties on the West Sector third 
shift.115 About six weeks later, on April 24, 2002, Mills was informed 
that she was going to be transferred again—this time, to patrol duties 
on the South Sector.116 After Mills objected to the re-assignment, she 
was transferred to the Record Room.117  
Mills subsequently sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the 
City of Evansville and certain officers in their individual capacities 
violated the United States Constitution by unlawfully retaliating 
against her because of her speech.118 The Southern District of Indiana 
granted summary judgment for Defendants, holding that although 
Mills’ statements after the meeting were protected, the police 
department’s “interest in efficient management of its operations” 
                                                 
112 Mills II, 452 F.3d at 647. 
113 Id.; Mills I, 2005 WL 1939917, at *2. 




118 Mills II, 452 F.3d at 647. 
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outweighed her First Amendment interests in the speech.119 Mills then 
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
In a one paragraph rationale, the Seventh Circuit reversed the 
district court, holding that Mills’ statements were not protected under 
Garcetti because: 
 
Mills was on duty, in uniform, and engaged in 
discussion with her superiors, all of whom had just 
emerged from [the] Chief[’s] briefing. She spoke in her 
capacity as a public employee contributing to the 
formation and execution of official policy. Under 
Garcetti her employer could draw inferences from her 
statements about whether she would not zealously 
implement the Chief’s plans or try to undermine them; 
when the department drew the latter inference it was 
free to act accordingly.120 
  
B. Mills unnecessarily extends Garcetti. 
 
Although the Seventh Circuit likely reached the right result, it 
seemingly did so for the wrong reasons. Mills improperly implies that 
all job-related statements are precluded from First Amendment 
protection under Garcetti. But, Garcetti’s holding is not so broad. 
Specifically, insofar as Mills implies that Brenda Mills was speaking 
pursuant to her official duties because her speech was propounded at 
the workplace and pertains to the subject matter of her employment: 
that reasoning was specifically rejected by Garcetti.121 Moreover, the 
Seventh Circuit could have reached the same result by either 
articulating a factual basis for holding that Mills was speaking 
pursuant to an employment duty, or by holding that her employer’s 
interest in maintaining the chain of command outweighed her First 
                                                 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 648. 
121 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1959 (2006). 
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Amendment interest in forwarding statements that were critical of the 
Chief of Police. 
 
1. Garcetti should be limited to internal communications that can be 
properly characterized as the employer’s speech. 
 
The facts and reasoning of the Garcetti opinion support a narrow 
reading that limits its holding to internal documents and other speech 
compelled by an employment duty. Underlying the Garcetti opinion is 
deference to the idea that government employers, “like private 
employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees’ 
words and actions; without it, there would be little chance for the 
efficient provision of public services.”122 But although the Supreme 
Court clearly intended to preclude government employees from stating 
First Amendment retaliation claims for statements properly 
encompassed within their official duties, the Court nonetheless implied 
limits on its holding.  
 First, Garcetti was a fact-specific case that dealt with a disposition 
memo Ceballos was unquestionably required to write. In determining 
that Ceballos’ disposition memo was written “pursuant to [his] 
employment duties,”123 the Supreme Court repeatedly stressed that 
Ceballos had an employment duty to write the memo. The Court 
explained that he was speaking “as a prosecutor fulfilling a 
responsibility to advise his supervisor about how best to proceed with 
a pending case”;124 that “[he] wrote his disposition memo because that 
is part of what he, as a calendar deputy was employed to do”;125 that 
the memo “owe[d] its existence” to his “professional 
responsibilities”;126 and Ceballos was “simply performing his . . . job 
                                                 
122 Id. at 1958. Moreover, the Court’s reasoning continues to support the idea 
that “managerial discretion” should not be “displace[d] . . . by judicial supervision.” 
Id. at 1961. 
123 Id. at 1957. 
124 Id. at 1959. 
125 Id. at 1960. 
126 Id. 
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duties.”127 The Court also referred to the disposition memo as “work 
product.”128 Thus:  
 
Ceballos did not act as a citizen when he went about 
conducting his daily professional activities, such as 
supervising attorneys, investigating charges, and 
preparing filings. In the same way he did not speak as a 
citizen by writing a memo that addressed the proper 
disposition of a pending criminal case. When he went to 
work and performed the tasks he was paid to perform, 
Ceballos acted as a government employee.129 
 
In contrast, Mills’ statements are not as clearly encompassed in 
her job responsibilities as the disposition memo in Garcetti. Mills 
made statements after the meeting she was required to attend had 
ended. 130 And although the Seventh Circuit noted that she was “on 
duty, in uniform, and engaged in discussion with her superiors,”131 
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion fails to indicate why these facts establish, 
as a matter of law, that Mills was speaking pursuant to her official 
duties.  
Second, the reasoning of Garcetti does not support a broad 
application. Garcetti reflects the ability of the government employer to 
control speech, like Ceballos’ disposition memo, that is cloaked as the 
speech of the employer.132 Such restrictions on documents “under the 
control, and vested with the authority, of [the] employer”133 do not 
                                                 
127 Id. at 1961. 
128 Id. at 1960. 
129 Id. 
130 Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind. (“Mills II”), 452 F.3d 646, 647 (7th Cir. 
2006). 
131 Id. at 648. 
132 See Garcetti, 126 S.Ct at 1960 (“Restricting speech that owes its existence 
to a public employee’s professional responsibilities” simply reflects the ability of the 
employer to “control . . . what the employer has itself commissioned or created”). 
133 Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 232 F.3d 836, 842 (11th Cir. 
2000) 
23
Mendonides: Speak No Evil? Government Employee Speech Rights in the Seventh C
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 2                       Spring 2007 
690 
violate the First Amendment because this type of speech is not 
properly categorized as employee speech at all.134 Accordingly, there is 
no “relevant analogue”135 to speech by citizens who are not 
government employees, and a government employer may limit and 
control such statements at its discretion.136 
And, on an intuitive level, this type of limited application of 
Garcetti does not elicit the same kind of negative gut-reaction as a 
broader application because it makes sense that the government should 
be given discretion to control its own speech. Indeed, the Seventh 
Circuit has employed similar reasoning in justifying limits on public 
school teachers’ speech in the classroom because “the school system 
does not ‘regulate’ teachers’ speech as much as it hires that speech.”137 
 Moreover, while Garcetti recognizes the broad discretion of the 
government employer to control its “official communications,”138 
nothing in Garcetti suggests that the Supreme Court intended to 
overrule Givhan by applying an overly broad interpretation of “official 
duties.” Indeed, Garcetti cites Givhan as good law.139 
Lastly, it should be noted that the Court never questioned the 
ability of Pickering balancing to protect a government employer’s 
legitimate interest in disciplining and discharging employees for 
speech that interferes with the efficiency of governmental 
operations.140 Because the second stage of Pickering analysis already 
                                                 
134 Id. 
135 Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1961.  
136 Id. 
137 Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 
2007). For a comprehensive discussion of the speech rights of public school teachers 
in light of Mayer v. Monroe see Justin Nemunaitis, Mayer v. Monroe: The Seventh 
Circuit Sheds Freedom of Speech at the Classroom Door, 2 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 
762 (2007), at http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v2-2/nemunaitis.pdf. 
138 Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1960. 
139 Id. at 1959. 
140 This is particularly true in the Seventh Circuit, which already interprets an 
“adverse employment action” narrowly for purposes of First Amendment retaliation 
claims. See Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind. (“Mills II”), 452 F.3d 646, 647-48 (7th 
Cir. 2006). 
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adequately protects a government employer’s ability to limit speech 
that jeopardizes operational efficiency, there is no reason to apply a 
broad interpretation of Garcetti that precludes all job-related 
statements from protection. In addition, allowing protection for 
statements under the first stage of Pickering while recognizing greater 
latitude for government employee discipline under the second stage 
would comport more with First Amendment jurisprudence, which 
recognizes that personal liberties should be narrowly proscribed.141 
 
2. Limiting Garcetti comports with Seventh Circuit precedent. 
 
The Seventh Circuit has addressed First Amendment retaliation 
claims by employees for statements made pursuant to employment 
responsibilities prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti.142 In 
Gonzalez v. City of Chicago, a Chicago police officer claimed he was 
retaliated against by the City of Chicago, its Chief of Police, and two 
supervisors in the city’s 18th District for investigative reports he 
completed on at least nine 18th District Officers during his previous 
employment as a civilian employee of the Chicago Police 
Department’s Office of Professional Standards.143  
The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the 
defendants holding that Gonzalez could not, as a matter of law, 
establish he was speaking “as a citizen” under Connick inasmuch as 
his statements were “written statements for internal use in the 
Department,”144 “required by his employer,”145 and the statements 
                                                 
141 See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (“even though the 
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued 
by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be 
more narrowly achieved”); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963) 
(“Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government 
may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity”). 
142 Gonzalez v. City of Chicago, 239 F.3d 939, 939-43 (7th Cir. 2001). 
143 Id. at 940.  
144 Id. at 941. 
145 Id. 
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were “created in the scope of [his] ordinary job responsibilities.”146 
Judges Ripple, Manion, and Kanne reasoned that although the 
investigations of police misconduct addressed a matter of public 
concern, Gonzalez was precluded from claiming First Amendment 
protection because the investigative reports were a “routine 
requirement of the job” and, as such, Gonzalez was “clearly acting 
entirely in an employment capacity [and not as a citizen] when he 
made those reports.”147 The judges further noted that the written 
reports were “mandated”148 by Gonzalez’s employment 
responsibilities, and failure to write the reports would be a “dereliction 
of employment duties” for which Gonzalez could have been fired.149 
In 2002, the Seventh Circuit reinforced the distinction between 
routine and discretionary duties for purposes of determining whether 
an employee is speaking as a citizen in Delgado v. Jones.150 That case 
involved a 15-year veteran of the Milwaukee Police Department who 
claimed he was retaliated against after reporting to his supervising 
lieutenant that he may have information about public school 
employees buying and selling drugs, and that he had an informant who 
claimed that a close relative of a public official had been frequenting a 
drug house.151 Judges Cudahy, Rovner, and Wood held that the 
officer’s statements were not per se precluded from protection under 
Gonzalez, distinguishing between “routine” statements of the type 
made in Gonzalez and “discretionary” statements, which maintain 
some prospect of protection.152 The panel reasoned that although 
“divulging [the] information to his superiors may have been consistent 
with his obligations as a police officer in seeking an independent and 
objective investigation,” the officer nonetheless maintained 
“considerable discretion about how he communicated the information 
                                                 
146 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 942. 
150 Delgado v. Jones, 282 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2002).  
151 Id. at 514. 
152 Id.  
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up the chain of command,” such that the statements “went beyond 
some rote, routine discharge of an assigned duty as in Gonzalez.”153 
While the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Spiegla v. Hull 
seemingly dispenses with the routine/discretionary distinction, at least 
in the context of internal whistleblowing within a chain of 
command,154 the reasoning of Spiegla case is not inconsistent with a 
limited application of Garcetti to speech compelled or “mandated” by 
an employment duty as in Gonzalez.  
In Spiegla, the “speech” at issue included Spiegla’s entries in her 
employer’s log book, and her internal reports to supervisors within her 
chain of command regarding the suspicious activities of two co-
workers.155 Those entries and reports were made after Spiegla 
observed the suspicious activities of two fellow prison guards in the 
course of her assignment to monitor the front door of the prison where 
she was employed.156 Accordingly, Spiegla is distinguishable from 
Mills because even if internal whistleblowing was not encompassed 
within Spiegla’s “core duties,” she nonetheless had an affirmative 
employment duty to report the alleged infractions, and the speech at 
issue—particularly her entries in the log book—could properly be 
characterized as the employer’s speech.  
 
3. The Seventh Circuit Could Have Reached the Same Result Without 
Stripping Mills’ Speech of First Amendment Protection. 
 
The Seventh Circuit could have relied on the second stage of 
Pickering analysis to justify the City of Evansville’s employment 
decisions. The court could have held, as the district court did, that the 
speech at issue was protected, but that the Evansville Police 
Department’s interest in promoting official policy and preventing 
                                                 
153 Id. at 519. 
154 Spiegla v. Hull, No. 05-3722, 2007 WL 937081, at *5 (7th Cir. Mar. 30, 
2007) (holding that “[the] focus on ‘core’ job functions is too narrow after 
Garcetti”). 
155 Id. at *2. 
156 Id. at *1. 
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disruption outweighed her interest in the speech. Because of the time 
and place in which Mills forwarded her speech, and because Mills 
voiced her opinion to superior officers out of her chain of command, 
Pickering balancing would favor the City of Evansville and, therefore, 
the court could have reached the same result without stripping Mills’ 
statements of First Amendment protection. 
Alternately, given that Judge Easterbrook devotes the majority of 
the opinion to a discussion of why Mills’ “lateral transfer” was not an 
adverse employment action for purposes of a First Amendment 
retaliation claim,157 the three-judge panel could have employed the 
same reasoning to hold that Mills’ statements were protected, but that 
Mills failed to state a retaliation claim because she had not established 
that she suffered an adverse employment action.  
 
 C. The Seventh Circuit improperly ignored the Supreme Court’s 
analytical guidelines. 
 
The Garcetti majority defined the “pursuant to official duty” 
inquiry as a “practical” inquiry into the scope of the employee’s 
professional duties.158 And, the Court specifically rejected the 
suggestion that “employers can restrict employees’ rights by creating 
excessively broad job descriptions.”159 However, the Seventh Circuit 
never considered what Mills’ job responsibilities actually consisted of, 
or whether attending the Chief’s meeting and supporting the Chief’s 
re-structuring proposal were a legitimate part of her job 
responsibilities such that she was speaking “pursuant to official duty” 
                                                 
157 The Seventh Circuit employs a three-stage burden-shifting analysis for First 
Amendment retaliation claims under § 1983: 1) the employee must establish that he 
engaged in constitutionally protected speech 2) the speech was a substantial or 
motivating factor in an adverse employment action taken against the employee 3) 
once the employee establishes the first two prongs, the burden shifts to the 
government defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the same 
action would have been taken irrespective of the protected speech. Kuchenreuther v. 
City of Milwaukee, 221 F.3d 967, 973 (7th Cir. 2000). 
158 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2006). 
159 Id. 
28
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 9
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss2/9
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 2                       Spring 2007 
695 
when she commented on the Chief’s proposal after the meeting.160 
Moreover, the court did not address whether Mills was the type of 
high-ranking employee such that “political loyalty [is considered] a 
valid qualification” and the employee can be disciplined for failure to 
promote official policy.161 Instead, the Seventh Circuit merely 
concluded without explanation that Mills was speaking pursuant to her 
official duties because she was “speaking in her capacity as a public 
employee contributing to the formation and execution of official 
policy.”162 
Because the Seventh Circuit never examined what Mills’ job 
description actually entailed, its reasoning could be interpreted broadly 
as holding that any employee statement that tangentially relates to the 
internal operations of a government employer is subsumed within an 
employee’s “official duties” under Garcetti.163 The related 
                                                 
160 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390 (1987). (In the context of 
“weighing the state’s interest in discharging an employee based on any claim that the 
content of the statement somehow undermines the mission of the public employer, 
some attention must be paid to the responsibilities of the employee within the 
agency. The burden of caution employees bear with respect to the words they speak 
will vary with the extent of authority and public accountability the employee’s role 
entails”). 
161 Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 772 (7th Cir. 2006). 
162 Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind. (“Mills II”), 452 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 
2006). 
163  
It could be persuasively argued that the Seventh Circuit’s 
definition goes beyond the bounds envisioned by the [Supreme] 
Court. It could be argued that if the standards upon which the 
Seventh Circuit based their decision had been used to assess Ardith 
McPherson or Bessie Givhan’s claims, the Supreme Court would 
have granted summary judgment and dismissed their claims. This 
[sic] Seventh Circuit’s definition of within the “scope of employ” 
is so broad that it effectively excludes the entire public employee 
labor force from First Amendment protection sans a few lone 
instances where some lucky soul may find safe harbor. 
 
Kathryn v. Cooper, Garcetti v. Ceballos: The Dual Threshold Requirement 
Challenging Public Employee Free Speech, 8 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 73, 93 (Fall 2006).  
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presumption—that “all matters which transpire within a government 
office are of public concern” 164—was expressly rejected in Connick, 
and such a sweeping generalization without further analysis should be 
similarly rejected in determining whether a government employee is 
speaking “as a citizen.”  
Even if Mills had a duty to respond to the Chief’s question, her 
statements should not be precluded from First Amendment protection 
simply because they are job-related. If the Chief was unhappy with the 
content of Mills’ response, he was free to discipline her for 
insubordination, or (as he did) for the time and manner in which she 
voiced her opinions.  
In addition, the three-judge panel never addressed, nor did it even 
mention in its summary of facts, that the Chief of Police initiated his 
conversation with Mills specifically because he had heard that several 
of the Crime Prevention Officers were contacting neighborhood 
groups and asking them to directly contact the mayor to criticize his 
proposal.165 Therefore, there is a justifiable inference that the purpose 
of the Chief’s conversation with Mills was to enlist Mills to stifle the 
protected speech of her subordinate officers.166 Arguably, such tasks 
were not a part of Mills official responsibilities, and Mills maintained 
the prospect of First Amendment protection in responding to such a 
suggestion. 
But perhaps of the greatest concern is the fact that had the three-
judge panel examined Mills’ job responsibilities, it likely could have 
found a justified basis for holding that Mills was speaking “pursuant to 
[her] official duties.” Under Garcetti, the Seventh Circuit could have 
reasoned that Mills was speaking pursuant to an official duty because 
                                                 
164 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983). 
165 Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind. (“Mills I”), No. 3:03CV00183-JDT-WGH, 
2005 WL 1939917, at *1 (S.D. Ind. June 28,2005), overruled by 452 F.3d 646, 646-
48 (7th Cir. 2006). 
166 Garcetti leaves unquestioned that public employees retain First Amendment 
protection for statements on matters of public concern made publicly and not in the 
course of their official duties. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006).. As 
such, Crime Prevention Officers were free to enlist neighborhood organizations to 
oppose the Chief’s re-organization plan.  
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Mills was required to attend the Chief’s meeting in lieu of her 
supervisor. Yet, Judge Easterbrook curiously omitted this point from 
his summary of facts.167 Had the opinion relied on this fact in its 
reasoning, Mills could be justified under Garcetti on the basis that 
Mills’ spoke pursuant to her official duties her attendance at the 
meeting was a required job responsibility. 
Alternately, the three-judge panel could have considered whether 
Mills was the type of high-ranking official whose employment duties 
include promoting official policy.168 If so, Mills’ job responsibilities 
may have legitimately encompassed her statements after the Chief’s 
meeting such that those statements were precluded from protection 
under Garcetti.169 
 
III. OTHER CIRCUITS’ INTERPRETATIONS 
 
Although Garcetti is a relatively recent opinion, the majority of 
circuits have applied its holding to determine whether a government 
employee spoke “pursuant to [] official duties.”170 Although many of 
these circuits have cited Mills for the proposition that government 
employees are not insulated from discipline for statements made 
pursuant to an employment duty171 the majority of circuits have, to 
                                                 
167 Mills I, 2005 WL 1939917, at *1. 
168 See Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 772 (7th Cir. 2006). 
169 Id. 
170 As of May 2, 2007, every circuit but the First Circuit has applied Garcetti. 
See Skehan v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 465 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2006); Hill v. Borough of 
Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225,242 (3d Cir. 2006); Campbell v. Galloway, No. 06-1038, 
2007 WL 1166101 (4th Cir. Apr. 20, 2007); Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 
480 F.3d 689, 692-93 (5th Cir. 2007); Haynes v. City of Circleville, Ohio, 474 F.3d 
357, (6th Cir. 2007); Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind., 452 F.3d 646, 647 (7th Cir. 
2006); McGee v. Pub. Water Supply, Dist. #2 of Jefferson County, Mo., 471 F.3d 
918, 920 (8th Cir. 2006); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 543 (9th Cir. 2006); Casey 
v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323, 1329-30 (10th Cir. 2007); Battle 
v. Bd. of Regents for the State of Ga., 468 F.3d 755, 760 (11th Cir. 2006); Wilburn 
v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140,1149-50 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  
171 See Williams, 480 F.3d at 694; Green v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 472 F.3d 
794, 799 (10th Cir. 2007); Wilburn, 480 F.3d at 1149. 
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date, limited their application of Garcetti to required job duties, 
including duties to report wrongdoing.172 
For example, the Fifth Circuit has held that an athletic director 
employed by a public school was speaking pursuant to his official 
duties when he wrote two separate memoranda173 complaining about 
the office manager’s failure to provide him with information relating 
to the athletic account.174 Interpreting Garcetti, the court emphasized 
that the plaintiff there was “performing activities required to fulfill his 
duties as a prosecutor and calendar deputy”175 and therefore reasoned 
that “job-required speech is not protected.”176 Applying that reasoning, 
the court held that the subject matter and context of the memoranda 
supported a holding that the athletic director was speaking pursuant to 
his official duties.177 The court reasoned that, although the writing the 
memo may not have been “demanded of him” in the same way as the 
memo in Garcetti, it was nonetheless created in the course of doing his 
job.178 Specifically, the court reasoned that the subject matter of the 
memoranda focused on the athletic director’s “daily operations” and 
that he needed the account information in order to do his job.179  
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has held that the Director of the 
District’s Office of Human Rights was speaking pursuant to an official 
duty where she complained that the District Office of Personnel’s 
salary decisions for two job applicants was discriminatory.180 In 
Wilburn v. Robinson, the court held that government employee speech 
                                                 
172 Hill, 455 F.3d at 230, 242; Green, 472 F.3d at 800-01; Williams, 480 F.3d 
at 690-91; McGee, 471 F.3d at 921; Freitag, 468 F.3d at 546; Battle, 468 F.3d at 
761; Wilburn, 480 F.3d at 1142, 1150.  
173 The first memorandum was sent to the school’s office manager and the 
second to the school’s principal. Williams, 480 F.3d at 690-91. 
174 Id. at 690-91, 694.  
175 Id. at 693. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 694.  
178 Id. 
179 Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 693 (5th Cir. 2007). 
180 Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1142, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(emphasis added). 
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is precluded from First Amendment protection where the contested 
speech “falls within the scope of the employee’s uncontested job 
responsibilities.”181 Thus, the Director was speaking pursuant to an 
official duty because her employment duties “easily” encompassed 
“identify[ing] and eliminat[ing] discriminatory practices in 
employment . . . in the District of Columbia.”182  
As Wilburn illustrates, several circuits have applied Garcetti to 
internal whistle-blowers who report wrongdoing up the chain of 
command.183 For instance, the Eleventh Circuit has held that an 
employee of a state university’s Office of Financial Aid and Veterans 
Affairs was speaking pursuant to her official duties when she reported 
concerns about fraudulent financial aid claims.184 Likewise, the Third 
Circuit has held that the Borough Manager of the Borough of 
Kutztown was speaking pursuant to an official duty when he reported 
complaints of harassment to the Borough Council.185 And, the Eighth 
Circuit held that a public employee was speaking pursuant to his 
official duties when he reported a concern about sewage leakage.186  
                                                 
181 Id. at 1150; but see Battle v. Bd. of Regents of Ga., 468 F.3d 755, 761 (11th 
Cir. 2006) (specifically rejecting the idea that Garcetti applies only to an 
“employee’s everyday job functions”). 
182 Id. at 1150-51 (alteration in original). 
183 Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 230, 242 (3d Cir. 2006); 
McGee v. Pub. Water Supply, Dist. #2 of Jefferson County, Mo., 471 F.3d 918, 921 
(8th Cir. 2006); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 546 (9th Cir. 2006); Casey v. W. Las 
Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323,1325 (10th Cir. 2007); Battle v. Bd. of 
Regents of Ga., 468 F.3d 755, 761-62 (11th Cir. 2006). 
184 Battle, 468 F.3d at 761-62. 
185 Hill, 455 F.3d at 230, 242. 
186 McGee, 471 F.3d at 921; but see Bradley v. James, 479 F.3d 536, 538 (8th 
Cir. 2007) (holding that the plaintiff’s allegations that a superior officer was 
intoxicated were precluded from protection, not because the plaintiff had a duty-to-
report, but because the statements were made during the course of the investigation 
and were, thus, made pursuant to his official duties); Haynes v. City of Circleville, 
Ohio, 474 F.3d 357, 360, 364 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that a Police Officer’s memo 
to is supervisor complaining about training cutbacks was speaking pursuant to an 
official duty). 
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The Ninth, Tenth, Second, and Fourth Circuits suggest that a 
distinction between required and discretionary reporting187 is still 
viable. In Freitag v. Ayers, the Ninth Circuit held that a female prison 
guard was speaking pursuant to her official duties when she filed 
internal complaints of sexual harassment by inmates, but she spoke as 
a citizen when she reported the same concerns outside of the 
Department of Corrections to her state senator and the California 
Inspector General.188 The court further held there was a factual issue as 
to whether she was speaking as a citizen when contravened the chain 
of command and complained to the Director of the Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation in the state capitol.189 Similarly, in 
Casey v. West Las Vegas Independent School Board, the Tenth Circuit 
held that a school superintendent, who was also the CEO of the 
school’s Head Start program,190 was speaking pursuant to an official 
duty when she voiced concerns about the program’s compliance with 
federal regulations to the School Board,191 but spoke as a citizen when 
she voiced those concerns to the state’s Attorney General.192 And, in 
Skehan v. Village of Mamaroneck, the Second Circuit refused to decide 
on summary judgment whether a Police Officer’s complaints to the 
state’s Attorney General regarding racial decision-making in the 
Department were encompassed in his employment duties.193  
Along the same lines, the Fourth Circuit has suggested that 
employee complaints about co-workers that address personal slights, 
as opposed to misconduct that affects the public, are not encompassed 
                                                 
187 Delgado v. Jones, 282 F.3d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 2002); Gonzalez v. City of 
Chicago, 239 F.3d 939, 941 (7th Cir. 2001). However, other circuits reject this 
distinction. Cf. Battle, 468 F.3d at 761 (specifically rejecting the idea that Garcetti 
applies only to an “employee’s everyday job functions”). 
188 468 F.3d 528, 546 (9th Cir. 2006).  
189 Id. 
190 473 F.3d 1323, 1325 (10th Cir. 2007). 
191 Id. at 1330. 
192 Id. at 1332-33.  
193 465 F.3d 96, 102, 106 (4th Cir. 2006). 
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in the duty-to-report.194 That circuit has remanded a case for further 
fact-finding to determine whether a female police officer was speaking 
pursuant to her official duties when she submitted a memo to the town 
attorney detailing “perceived slights” and potentially harassing 
conduct by other officers.195 
Other circuits’ interpretations of Garcetti demonstrate why an 
overly broad reading of Mills, which encompasses all job-related 
statements, is inappropriate. The majority of these circuits have only 
read Garcetti’s bar to apply in one or a combination of two 
circumstances: 1) where the speech is compelled or required by an 
employment duty, and 2) usually where the speech is forwarded using 
a medium controlled by the employer; whether it be a log book, an 
internal grievance procedure, or a reporting dichotomy. In light of 
these decisions, a broad application of Mills likely misapplies the 
Supreme’s Court decision and creates bad precedent and as such, the 
Seventh Circuit should re-visit and clarify its holding in Mills.  
 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYERS  
IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
A. Implications for government employees 
 
Because the Mills opinion did not expressly hold that Sergeant 
Mills was speaking pursuant to an official duty solely because she was 
on duty and in uniform, government employees in the Seventh Circuit 
may argue that Mills should be limited to its facts, and that Mills can 
only be supported on two logical bases: 1) because Mills was required 
to attend the Chief’s meeting, or 2) because Mills was the type of 
high-ranking official whose employment responsibilities include 
supporting, without questioning, the official stance of her employer. 
Public employees may further argue that a broader reading of Mills is 
                                                 
194 Campbell v. Galloway, No. 06-1038, 2007 WL 1166101 (4th Cir. Apr. 20, 
2007). 
195 Id. at *1. 
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inconsistent with the facts and reasoning of Garcetti, and with the 
history of Supreme Court jurisprudence leading to Garcetti. 
But even in light of the broad application that Mills suggests, the 
Seventh Circuits decision, arguably, will not greatly affect lower level 
whistleblowers whose job descriptions do not include a duty-to-report. 
In addition, employees would seem to maintain protection from 
retaliation for statements made at the workplace which are not part of 
a delegated task and do not pertain to the subject matter of 
employment—for example, an employee’s expression of unpopular 
political ideas in the lunchroom.196 It should also be remembered that, 
even in light of Garcetti, government employees are still protected for 
whistleblowing under Title VII,197 state whistleblower statutes,198 and 
other federal statutes.199 
 
B. Implications for government employers 
 
Although Mills assists government employers by allowing them to 
dispose of a large variety of claims at the summary judgment stage, its 
broad holding can nonetheless work against a government employer 
who does not employ sufficient internal mechanisms against 
retaliation. As Section III demonstrates, Garcetti has been held to 
protect an employee’s complaints outside of the chain of command. 
Thus, an employer that does not internally safeguard employees from 
retaliatory employment actions creates an incentive for employees to 
                                                 
196 Compare Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F.3d 878, 887 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting 
Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 (7th Cir. 1990)) (“Casual chit-chat between 
two persons or otherwise confined to a small group . . . is not protected”) (alteration 
in original), with Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386-88 (1987) (holding First 
Amendment protection extended to private statements made by an employee to a co-
worker regarding the attempted assassination of then President, Ronald Reagan).  
197 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-3 (West 2007). 
198 See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 415/19 c.1 (West 2007); IND. CODE 36-1-8-8 
(West 2007); WIS. STAT. § 230.80 (West 2007).  
199 See generally Peter O. Hughes, Employment at Will, 10-259 LAB. AND EMP. 
L. (Matther Bender) § 259.04 n.5 (2007), available at LEXIS 10-259 Lab. and Emp. 
Law § 259.04.  
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bypass the employer’s internal mechanisms, and to report their 
concerns outside of the office, or directly to the public.  
Government employers should also employ internal review 
processes prior to disciplining or discharging employees in connection 
with statements made at the workplace to ensure that they are not left 
open to liability under Garcetti. In addition, these employers would be 
wise to base their internal procedures on a narrower reading of Mills in 




The Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos will likely 
continue to spawn debate over what types of employee speech are 
encompassed within a government employee’s official duties. 
Although the First Circuit has not yet addressed this issue, Garcetti 
should be limited to speech required by an employment duty, or 
forwarded using a medium controlled by the employer. In addition, 
other circuits that have addressed the issue should continue to limit 
their holdings to these scenarios, leaving the second stage of Pickering 
balancing to protect government employer’s legitimate interest in 
limiting disruptive speech. Because other circuits have so limited their 
application of Garcetti, the Seventh Circuit should clarify its holding 
in Mills and define a method for analysis for determining when 
statements are made pursuant to an official duty to provide certainty 
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